Studies on Public Economics: Approaches from the Theory of Mechanism Design
Project/Area Number |
24830109
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Research Field |
Economic theory
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Research Institution | Kansai University |
Principal Investigator |
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Project Period (FY) |
2012-08-31 – 2014-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥390,000 (Direct Cost: ¥300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥90,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥390,000 (Direct Cost: ¥300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥90,000)
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Keywords | ゲーム理論 / ミクロ経済学 / 公共経済学 / 社会言語学 / 社会選択理論 / メカニズムデザイン |
Research Abstract |
We study a problem of mechanism design theory. We study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategy-proofness and no-vetoer. We also construct a large coordination game model of second-language acquisition.
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Report
(3 results)
Research Products
(6 results)