| Project/Area Number |
25380237
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Chuo University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
KAWAGOE Toshiji 公立はこだて未来大学, システム情報科学部, 教授 (80272277)
YAMAMORI Tetsuo 高崎経済大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (50552006)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,290,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥990,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
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| Keywords | 実験ゲーム理論 / コミュニケーション / 事前コミュニケーション / 事後コミュニケーション / 限定合理性 / レベルk理論 / 事後的コミュニケーション / 事前的コミュニケーション / 囚人のジレンマ / 男女の争い / 最後通牒ゲーム / 協調ゲーム / チキンゲーム |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This project aims to understand the effects of communication on the play of games with focus on the difference in its timing. We experimented with major 2x2 games, such as prisoner’s dilemma, chicken game, coordination game, battle of the sexes, ultimatum game, under the condition with no communication, pre-play communication and post-play communication, and compared the experimental results.
To make the comparison meaningful, we adopted the message form in which the sender states her “hope” for a specific play of the receiver. Our findings are (1) even without communication, players have strong tendency to coordinate their choices, (2) sender sends a message such that she can maximize her payoff, while receiver almost perfectly predicts such messages, which means that players understand the incentive structure of the games very well, and (3) regardless of the timing of communication, the receiver is cautious about the self-interested behavior on the side of the sender.
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