| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,770,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥870,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This project formulates and studies the requirement on a kidney exchange mechanism that no pair of patients should be able to benefit by exchanging their donors with each other using either fake marriage or fake adoption prior to the operation of the chosen mechanism. We call this requirement “pre-exchange-proofness.” We show that the top trading cycles mechanism is the only mechanism satisfying individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and pre-exchange-proofness. Moreover, it turns out that a stronger version of pre-exchange-proofness is incompatible with individual rationality whenever there are three or more patients.
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