Mechanism Design in the Kidney Exchange Problem
Project/Area Number |
25380244
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Economic theory
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Research Institution | Ryukoku University |
Principal Investigator |
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Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
星野 裕二 (藤中裕二 / 藤中 裕二 / 星野 裕二(藤中裕二)) 大阪経済大学, 経済学部, 講師 (20552277)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2017-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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Budget Amount *help |
¥3,770,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥870,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
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Keywords | 経済理論 / ゲーム理論 / メカニズム・デザイン / マーケット・デザイン / マッチング / 社会的選択理論 / メカニズムデザイン / マーケットデザイン |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This project formulates and studies the requirement on a kidney exchange mechanism that no pair of patients should be able to benefit by exchanging their donors with each other using either fake marriage or fake adoption prior to the operation of the chosen mechanism. We call this requirement “pre-exchange-proofness.” We show that the top trading cycles mechanism is the only mechanism satisfying individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and pre-exchange-proofness. Moreover, it turns out that a stronger version of pre-exchange-proofness is incompatible with individual rationality whenever there are three or more patients.
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(10 results)