| Project/Area Number |
25380300
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
|---|
| Section | 一般 |
|---|
| Research Field |
Economic policy
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Kobe University |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
OHTA HIROSHI 神戸大学, 国際協力研究科, 教授 (50118006)
|
|---|
| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
KATAYAMA SEIICHI 愛知学院大学, 経済学部, 客員教授 (70047489)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,730,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥630,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | 資源貿易 / 環境汚染税 / 動学ゲーム / ナッシュ均衡 / シュタッケルベルク均衡 / 排出権取引 / 総量規制 / 原単位規制 / 排出量取引 / 国際情報交換（カナダ） / 枯渇資源 / 環境税 / シュタッケルベルグ解 |
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Consider a policy competition and coordination among exporting and importing countries of an exhaustible resource. Resource exporting revenueis the sole source of income for the exporter and the importing country obtains benefit from consuming the imported resource but suffers from environmental pollution which aggravates progressively as the cumulative amount of excavated resource increases. Then, the exporter determines its export revenue maximizing price of resource, while the importing country imposes a pollution tax so as to maximize the benefit of resource consumption net of social damages from pollution. As the result of this international resource transaction game, the export price of resource gradually decreases but the domestic price of resource in the importing country increases and the demand for resource decreases over time.
|
