Theoretical studies on emissions trading scheme in a global economy
| Project/Area Number |
25380334
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic policy
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| Research Institution | Rissho University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,250,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥750,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
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| Keywords | 環境政策 / 排出量取引 / 政治経済 / 貿易自由化 / 貿易政策 / グランドファザリング方式 / オークション方式 / 環境税 / 開放経済 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This research theoretically investigated the domestic emissions trading scheme in an open economy using a political economy framework. By constructing a model in which the amount of emissions cap and the distribution of emissions permits were endogenously determined, we showed that a corruptible government issued inefficient amounts of emissions cap to benefit its preferable group. We also showed that a pro-welfare government which would be replaced by a corruptible government in the future chose grandfathering system to make the amount of emissions cap chosen in the future more efficient. Finally, we showed that trade liberalization (or globalization) would enhance the efficiency of the emissions trading scheme in the sense that it would correct the inefficient choices by the corruptible government.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(5 results)
