| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,680,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,080,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
A new hospital financing system named diagnosis procedure combination/per-diem payment system (DPC/PDPS or DPC) has been introduced in Japan in 2003. DPC has given different incentives for hospitals from the former fee-for-service (FFS) reimbursement and it has been expected that DPC saves Japanese medical care cost because DPC is a kind of prospective payment system. However, even after the financing reform, each hospital can choose which payment system, DPC or FFS, is applied to him/her by him/herself. If each hospital selects a payment that is more profitable for him/her, the introduction of the new payment system cannot lead to medical care cost containment.
In this research, we examine the effect of strategic interaction among hospitals that entry into DPC market on their profits. We estimate how profit of a hospital changes depending on its own and rival's entry behavior into the DPC market since medical care cost is highly correlated with hospitals' profit.
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