Institutional Investors in Japan's Corporate Governance
| Project/Area Number |
25380397
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Money/ Finance
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| Research Institution | Akita International University |
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Principal Investigator |
Yeh Tsung-ming 国際教養大学, 国際教養学部, 教授 (20404858)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2017-03-31
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,030,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥930,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Keywords | 企業統治 / 株主提案 / 買収防衛策 / ファンド / 地方銀行 / リスクマネジメント / 企業買収 / 倒産リスク / 企業価値 / エントレンチメント仮説 / 買収ファンド / 銀行 / 利害衝突 / 金融危機 / 社外取締役 / 金融機関 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This research project conducts several empirical studies on the roles played by institutional investors in Japan’s corporate governance. The results indicate that institutional investors can contribute to the enhancement of firm value by either taking over inefficient companies, or by intervention via the legally binding shareholder proposals. In contrast, it is found that stock market reacts negatively to companies adopting anti-takeover provisions that deter such intervention by outside shareholders. However, such shareholder intervention is constrained for banks which are highly regulated and thus protected by the government. The empirical results, instead, show that board-level governance such as risk-management is important in disciplining bank behaviors.
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(12 results)
