A Game Theoretical Analysis of Financial Accounting in Multi-Period Models
| Project/Area Number |
25380617
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Accounting
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| Research Institution | Chuo University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
平井 秀明 西南学院大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (10610959)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥390,000 (Direct Cost: ¥300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥90,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
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| Keywords | 利益操作 / 企業会計 / ゲーム理論 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This research reviews and illustrates earnings management, tightening accounting standards, and their effects on investor benefits in an economic modeling framework. Earnings management has a distinctive feature: if the manager manipulates earnings in a period, the managed earnings must eventually reverse over time. To address this feature, we consider a multi-period model with two types of earnings management, accounting and real earnings management. We show that, in this model, since tighter accounting standards can affect only accounting management, the manager engages more strongly in real earnings management and the benefit of investors can even decrease rather than increase as intended.
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(14 results)
