Mechanism design of dynamic resource allocations
| Project/Area Number |
25780132
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kyoto University |
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Principal Investigator |
Sano Ryuji 京都大学, 経済研究所, 助教 (50611208)
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| Research Collaborator |
MURAMOTO Akitoshi 駒澤大学, 経済学部, 非常勤講師
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| Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,380,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥780,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / オークション / メカニズムデザイン / 経済理論 / 制度設計 / 動的制度設計 |
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
I study environments in which objects are repeatedly allocated by auctions. First, I study dynamic mechanism design problem in which objects are allocated in each period and agents have perfect complementarity for intertemporal objects. I characterize the incentive compatibility in the environment with multi-dimensional type and derive both efficient and revenue-maximizing mechanisms. Second, I also study sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects. I provide the conditions for the existence of a symmetric increasing equilibrium and for declining prices in the equilibrium.
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(30 results)
