| Project/Area Number |
25780193
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Public economy
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| Research Institution | Meikai University (2014-2016)
Waseda University (2013) |
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Principal Investigator |
TOMORI Atsuo 明海大学, 経済学部, 講師 (50608833)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000)
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| Keywords | 最適規制 / 大規模事故 / 防災 / 減災 / 有限責任 / 大規模事故リスク / 賠償負担能力 / 拡大責任 / 政治経済学 / インセンティブ / 規制 / 再選誘因 / キャリアコンサーン |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We use a model comprising three actors (i.e., regulator, firm, and public) in order to analyze the optimal rule of sanctions when firms simultaneously take two kinds of precautions, namely disaster prevention and disaster reduction. We analyze three topics; (1)the impact of re-election concern on optimal regulation, (2)the optimal risk regulation under asymmetric information of solvency, (3)the optimal level of discretion left by politician to regulator.
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