Designing voluntary incentives for efficient private forest conservation
Project/Area Number |
25870362
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
|
Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Research Field |
Economic policy
Economic theory
|
Research Institution | Kyoto University |
Principal Investigator |
Mitani Yohei 京都大学, 農学研究科, 准教授 (70647172)
|
Research Collaborator |
LINDHJEM Henrik ノルウェー自然研究所
DAY Brett イーストアングリア大学
FLORES Nicholas コロラド大学
|
Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2017-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥4,290,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥990,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
|
Keywords | 実験経済学 / 森林保全 / インセティブ設計 / フィールド実験 / 自発的参加 / インセンティブ設計 / ラボ実験 / 協調ゲーム / 囚人のジレンマゲーム / スタグハントゲーム |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We first analyze what motivates Norwegian forest owners to participate in a national voluntary conservation program. The results suggest that forest owners’ expectation of sustainable non-timber income enhanced by the program has strong positive effects on the likelihood of participation. Second, we propose a hierarchical agglomeration bonus mechanism to create incentives for agents in a hierarchical spatial structure to promote coordination among agents at desired spatial levels. The results show that allocating a higher portion of the total agglomeration bonus to local-level bonuses sharply reduces coordination failure and facilitates a consensus on selecting the payoff dominant strategy at the local-level, leading to a larger-scale, global-level successful coordination. The results suggest that the locally weighted scheme can contribute to habitat connectivity as well as successful global coordination.
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(26 results)