On the Asset Substitution Problem and the Optimal Debt Contract with a Consideration of the Debt Collection Rules and the Quantity-Setting Competition
Project/Area Number |
25870424
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Research Field |
Money/ Finance
Public finance/Public economy
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Research Institution | Hosei University |
Principal Investigator |
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Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥2,340,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥540,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
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Keywords | 契約理論 / 寡占理論 / 契約 / 資金配分 / 競争 / 最適借入契約 / 資本配分 / 寡占市場競争 / 金融構造 / 寡占 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
I study an optimal debt contracting problem and its resulting capital allocation with a firm confronting the asset substitution problem. Then, I show that (i) the first-best borrowing and allocation result is achievable when and only when the firm’s initial wealth is not less than a sufficient level and that (ii) the asset substitution does not occur but the optimum amount of borrowing is less than the first-best level when the initial wealth level is insufficient but comparatively high and the asset substitution does occur when it is not the case. Further, I study an effect on the competition outcome and then show that (i) the realization of asset substitution can increase the aggregate output in less competitive market and consequently heighten the social welfare as a whole and that (ii) a financial improvement in the asset level can damage the financial status in the cash-flow level and lower the social welfare as a whole, moreover.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(1 results)