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Dynamic Contract Theory of Capital Formation and Managerial Replacement

Research Project

Project/Area Number 26380236
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

Allocation TypeMulti-year Fund
Section一般
Research Field Economic theory
Research InstitutionKyoto University

Principal Investigator

Osano Hiroshi  京都大学, 経済研究所, 教授 (90152462)

Project Period (FY) 2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
Project Status Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
Budget Amount *help
¥3,510,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥810,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Keywords経営者交代 / 投資 / トービンのQ / 連続時間契約理論 / 連続時間契約モデル / トービンのQ / コーポレート・ガバナンス / 経営者報酬
Outline of Final Research Achievements

In this research, I explore a dynamic theory of investment and costly managerial turnover assuming not only agency conflicts between the firm manager and investors, but also the limited commitment of investors to the firm's manager-replacement policy. I incorporate the possibility of the successive discretionary replacement of managers until the firm is finally liquidated, and develop a continuous-time agency model using the q-theory of investment. I derive the joint dynamics of the average q, marginal q, and optimal investment--capital ratios involved in manager turnover.

Report

(4 results)
  • 2016 Annual Research Report   Final Research Report ( PDF )
  • 2015 Research-status Report
  • 2014 Research-status Report
  • Research Products

    (2 results)

All 2017 2014

All Journal Article (2 results) (of which Peer Reviewed: 2 results)

  • [Journal Article] Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies, and Real Options2017

    • Author(s)
      Keiichi Hori and Hiroshi Osano
    • Journal Title

      Japanese Economic Review

      Volume: 印刷中

    • Related Report
      2016 Annual Research Report
    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Journal Article] Investment Timing Decisions of Managers under Endogenous Contracts2014

    • Author(s)
      Keiichi Hori and Hiroshi Osano
    • Journal Title

      Journal of Corporate Finance

      Volume: 29 Pages: 607-627

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.11.013

    • NAID

      120005525706

    • Related Report
      2014 Research-status Report
    • Peer Reviewed

URL: 

Published: 2014-04-04   Modified: 2018-03-22  

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