Dynamic Contract Theory of Capital Formation and Managerial Replacement
| Project/Area Number |
26380236
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kyoto University |
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Principal Investigator |
Osano Hiroshi 京都大学, 経済研究所, 教授 (90152462)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,510,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥810,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
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| Keywords | 経営者交代 / 投資 / トービンのQ / 連続時間契約理論 / 連続時間契約モデル / トービンのＱ / コーポレート・ガバナンス / 経営者報酬 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In this research, I explore a dynamic theory of investment and costly managerial turnover assuming not only agency conflicts between the firm manager and investors, but also the limited commitment of investors to the firm's manager-replacement policy. I incorporate the possibility of the successive discretionary replacement of managers until the firm is finally liquidated, and develop a continuous-time agency model using the q-theory of investment. I derive the joint dynamics of the average q, marginal q, and optimal investment--capital ratios involved in manager turnover.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(2 results)
