| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,680,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,080,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This study develops an economic model of strategic inter-temporal permit banking under imperfect competition. We further extend the model to simulate real markets such as the California power and permit markets. We show that the dominant firm exerts market power under imperfect competition and imperfect inter-temporal arbitrage. Consequently, the permit price rises at a higher rate than the discount rate. This is in contrary to the perfectly competitive permit market, where the permit price rises at the discount rate following the classic Hotelling's rule.
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