| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,770,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥870,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
|
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This study explores whether aviation charge regulation is necessary at privatized airports. We employ a structural model of airline competition in the Japanese domestic air passenger market. We find that airports without integration set nine times higher than current aviation charge. When airports integrate the non-aviation sector, they tend to set lower aviation charges by 5.6-20.5 %. Consequently, non-aviation charges are lowered. Competition among airports also tends to lower aviation charges. Nonetheless, single-till regulation dominates dual-till regulation at non-congested airports, regarding welfare maximization. We find that aviation charges will remain high if airports maximize profits, whether they are integrated with highly profitable non-aviation companies and airport competition or not. Regarding mergers between airports, it is possible that the total surplus will be reduced if the airports are not complementary but competing.
|
