| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,420,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,020,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Patents provide incentives for R&D, which may leads to innovation. Rival firms may infringe the original innovator's patents. The court imposes injunctions and damages as remedies against patent infringement. Injunctions stop rivals from further infringement, while damages are paid by the imitator to the original innovator. Under Japan’s Patent Law, damages can take the form of lost profit, unjust enrichment, or reasonable royalty. I developed a simple duopoly model with an innovator and a potential imitator to analyze R&D incentives under lost profit and unjust enrichment regimes.
Under lost profit, strengthening patent protection increases the innovator’s profit and encourages R&D investment when the cost of R&D is low, but discourages R&D when the cost of R&D is high.
When the cost of R&D is very high, unjust enrichment results in excessive patent protection. When the cost of R&D is neither very high nor very low, lost profit provides insufficient patent protection.
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