| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,680,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,080,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥2,080,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥480,000)
|
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The purpose of this study is to examine roles for corporate environmental reporting systems in controlling managerial decision making about environmental management. This study analyzes why managerial discretion arises in corporate environmental reporting, focusing on the possibility that the delegation of reporting management to managers may arise from the principal-agent relationship. Equilibrium analysis shows that the principal may prefer allowing the agent to engage in reporting management to imposing truthful reporting. Delegating reporting discretion allows the agent to communicate private information to the market, which then leads to an increase in market sensitivity. This provides the agent an incentive to exert more productive efforts and, thus, imposes a larger reporting error cost on the agent. When the principal monitors reports, he/she benefits from delegating reporting discretion to the manager.
|
