Decision-Facilitating Role of Environmental Accounting Information on Control of Environmental Impacts
Project/Area Number |
26380622
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Accounting
|
Research Institution | Shiga University |
Principal Investigator |
Noda Akihiro 滋賀大学, 経済学部, 教授 (40350235)
|
Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
阪 智香 関西学院大学, 商学部, 教授 (10309403)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2018-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥4,680,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,080,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥2,080,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥480,000)
|
Keywords | 環境会計 / 環境負債 / 意思決定誘導機能 / 意思決定誘導 / コーポレートガバナンス / 非財務情報 / 会計報告 / 企業ガバナンス / 情報開示 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The purpose of this study is to examine roles for corporate environmental reporting systems in controlling managerial decision making about environmental management. This study analyzes why managerial discretion arises in corporate environmental reporting, focusing on the possibility that the delegation of reporting management to managers may arise from the principal-agent relationship. Equilibrium analysis shows that the principal may prefer allowing the agent to engage in reporting management to imposing truthful reporting. Delegating reporting discretion allows the agent to communicate private information to the market, which then leads to an increase in market sensitivity. This provides the agent an incentive to exert more productive efforts and, thus, imposes a larger reporting error cost on the agent. When the principal monitors reports, he/she benefits from delegating reporting discretion to the manager.
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(13 results)