| Project/Area Number |
26380634
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Accounting
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| Research Institution | Kansai University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
岩崎 拓也 関西大学, 商学部, 准教授 (30611363)
椎葉 淳 大阪大学, 経済学研究科, 教授 (60330164)
首藤 昭信 東京大学, 大学院経済学研究科(経済学部), 准教授 (60349181)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,680,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,080,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
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| Keywords | 経営者報酬契約 / 会計利益 / 予想利益 / 経営者報酬 / 会計数値 / 利益ベンチマーク / コーポレトガバナンス / 経営者予想 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Although specific contents of management compensation contracts are implicit in Japan, the design of the contracts is likely to influence management action and firm performance. In the realization of efficient incentive system, it is important to determine the measures to evaluate performance of management.
This study investigates whether and how Japanese firms use management earnings forecasts as a performance target for determining management cash compensation. Consistent with the implications of the agency theory, we find that the sensitivity of management cash compensation varies with the extent to which realized earnings exceed initial management forecasts.
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