Analysis on the most suitable allocation of resources of the emissions trading scheme (ETS) assuming maximization behavior of national interests by national sovereignty
Project/Area Number |
26550110
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
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Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Research Field |
Environmental policy and social systems
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Research Institution | Hiroshima University |
Principal Investigator |
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Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
金子 慎治 広島大学, 国際協力研究科, 教授 (00346529)
吉田 雄一朗 広島大学, 国際協力研究科, 教授 (70339919)
後藤 大策 広島大学, 国際協力研究科, 准教授 (80432847)
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Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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Budget Amount *help |
¥4,030,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥930,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
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Keywords | 排出権取引 / 温暖化問題 / 排出権取引制度 / 産業連関分析 / CBDR原則 / 国家主権 / 経済効果 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
(1)Even if introducing each country's sovereignty under a rule of CBDR (Common But Differentiated Responsibilities) for preventing global warming phenomena, the emission trade scheme (ETS) combining offset cannot necessarily reach to the social optimal point. The main reason that there is no agent who can design the global society as a whole, and each country's optimization isn't necessarily the global optimization. (2) Regarding effect of ETS introducing in individual country, we analyzed Japan's case with some scenarios of simulation. Our result that introducing ETS in Japan would lead to negative effects to economic growth, but this result is same with a previous report done by Ministry of the Environment (2012).
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(9 results)