| Project/Area Number |
26590046
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Public economy
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| Research Institution | Osaka University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
座主 祥伸 関西大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (40403216)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,510,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥810,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
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| Keywords | 法と経済学 / 進化ゲーム理論 / 所有権ルール / 損害賠償ルール / 法と経済発展 / 法と社会規範 / 近代日本経済 / 担保 / 法と経済学「国際情報交換、USA」 / 進化ゲーム理論「国際情報交換、カナダ」 / 所有権「国際情報交換、カナダ」 / 法と経済発展「国際情報交換、USA」 / 近代日本経済「国際情報交換、USA」 / 政治経済学 「国際情報交換、USA」 / 不法行為「国際情報交換、USA」 / 法と社会規範「国際情報交換、USA」 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This research studied the fundamental problem in law and economics about the rational choice between property rules versus liability rules in the legal situation of tort. It applied the theoretical framework of evolutionary game theory and showed that evolutionary stable choice between liability rules and property rules depends on the relative magnitude of productivity of the defendant and plaintiff with respect to the potentially common property.
Related with this topic, it also studied the efficient choice between legislated law and social norm, and the relationship between the state and civil society.
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