A Theory of Algorithm Design with Incentives

• Project/Area Number: 26730005
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Theory of informatics
• Research Institution: Kyushu University
• Principal Investigator: Todo Taiki 九州大学, システム情報科学研究科(研究院, 助教 (50708394)
• Project Period (FY): 2014-04-01 – 2016-03-31
• Project Status: Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
• Budget Amount: ¥2,340,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥540,000); Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000); Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
• Keywords: ゲーム理論 / アルゴリズム設計 / マルチエージェントシステム / ミクロ経済学 / メカニズムデザイン / ダミー入力

Outline of Final Research Achievements

During this research project, we investigated the effect of dummy input in various algorithms. For individual allocation problems, we consider both barter exchange and cake cutting. We also define a weaker notion of resistance, based on computational complexity, against dummy input and showed that a simple extension of the top-trading-cycles algorithm satisfies it. For social decision problems, we dealt with location of two identical facilities on a line. We successfully characterized the behavior of algorithms that is resistant to dummy input. Furthermore, we provided several complexity results for a variant of picking sequence problem, in which the sequence is randomly determined.
Some of these contributions appeared in proceedings of top-tier AI conferences, such as AAAI, AAMAS, and IJCAI, and presented at the venues.

Research Products

• [Int'l Joint Research] City University of Hong Kong(Hong Kong)
• [Presentation] Manipulations in two-agent sequential allocation with random sequences (2016)
  • Author(s): Yuto Tominaga, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo.
  • Organizer: The Thirtieth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS 2016)
  • Place of Presentation: Singapore, Singapore
  • Year and Date: 2016-05-09
  • Int'l Joint Research
• [Presentation] False-name-proof locations of two facilities: Economic and algorithmic approaches (2016)
  • Author(s): Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo
  • Organizer: The Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2016)
  • Place of Presentation: Phoenix, Arizona, US
  • Year and Date: 2016-02-12
  • Int'l Joint Research
• [Presentation] Exchange of indivisible objects with asymmetry (2015)
  • Author(s): Zhaohong Sun, Hideaki Hata, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo
  • Organizer: The Twenty-Fourth International Joint Con- ference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2015)
  • Place of Presentation: Buenos Aires, Argentina
  • Year and Date: 2015-07-25
  • Int'l Joint Research
• [Presentation] Fairness and false-name manipulations in randomized cake cutting (2015)
  • Author(s): Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, and Makoto Yokoo
  • Organizer: The Fourteenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS 2015)
  • Place of Presentation: Istanbul, Turkey
  • Year and Date: 2015-05-04
  • Int'l Joint Research
• [Presentation] A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange with Multiple Indivisible Goods under Lexicographic Preferences (2015)
  • Author(s): Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
  • Organizer: Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-15)
  • Place of Presentation: Austin, Texas, US
  • Year and Date: 2015-01-25 – 2015-01-30
• [Remarks] A Theory of Algorithm Design with Incentives
  • URL: https://sites.google.com/site/taikitodo/2014wakateb