| Project/Area Number |
26780122
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
|
| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
|---|
| Research Field |
Economic theory
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Wakayama University |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
|
|---|
| Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha) |
KOBAYASHI Hajime 関西大学, 経済学部, 教授 (10347510)
SEKIGUCHI Tadashi 京都大学, 経済研究所, 教授 (20314461)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,950,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥450,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | 繰り返しゲーム / チーム生産 / 繰り返しパートナーシップ / Repeated Games / Imperfect Monitoring / Partnerships |
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We investigate cooperation in teams by theoretical analysis of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. In particular, we extend the model of repeated partnerships by Radner, Myerson and Maskin (1986, Review of economic Studies) allowing heterogeneous partners to choose and commit their sharing rule to achieve the most efficient equilibrium in the sense of maximizing the partners' total payoffs. We characterize the optimal sharing rule which supports the most efficient equilibrium payoff vector. We also consider the situation where it is not efficient for all members to work, and obtain the necessary and sufficient condition to achieve exact efficiency. Even when the condition fails, we obtain the approximate efficiency result.
|
