| Project/Area Number |
26780127
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Ritsumeikan University |
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Principal Investigator |
Takeuchi Ai 立命館大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (10453979)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2018-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,080,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥480,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
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| Keywords | 社会的ジレンマ / 公共財供給ゲーム / 罰則制度 / フィードバック情報 / モニタリング / 実験経済学 / ゲーム理論 / 情報 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The researches we conducted analyze the effectiveness of two centralized punishment institutions in raising the efficiency and the cooperation rates in social dilemma under different information conditions. In the punishment institutions considered, there is a required level of cooperation. In the absolute punishment institution, all individuals who cooperate less than required is punished, where as in the relative punishment institution, among those who cooperated less than required, only the minimum cooperator is punished. In the existing study, it had been shown that relative punishment institution yields the same or higher cooperation and efficiency than the absolute punishment institution. However, this study showed that the effectiveness of the punishment institution is sometimes reversed when the information condition is changed.
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