| Project/Area Number |
26780183
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Public economy
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| Research Institution | Hyogo University of Health Sciences |
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Principal Investigator |
NISHIDA Kiheiji 兵庫医療大学, 共通教育センター, 講師 (50631652)
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| Research Collaborator |
MATSUURA Nariaki 大阪大学大学院医学系研究科, 医療経済経営学寄付講座, 特任教授 (70190402)
HAMADA Yoshinosuke 大阪大学大学院医学系研究科, 医療経済経営学寄付講座, 特任准教授 (10362683)
KAWAKAMI Tetsu 近畿大学, 経済学部, 教授 (60402674)
YAMADA Eri 近畿大学, 総合社会学部, 講師 (30706742)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2016-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,210,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥510,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
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| Keywords | 出来高払い制度 / 包括払い制度 / 医師誘発需要 / 医療施設の空間競争 / 医師誘発需要仮設 / 医療施設の空間的競争 / 適切な医療圏域の設定 / 空間的競争モデル / DPC/PDPS / 出来高払い制 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Regional mal-distribution of healthcare providers such as hospitals and clinics is conspicuous in Japan. This study analyzes whether Japan's fee-for-service reimbursement system (FFSRS) or its diagnosis procedure combination/per-diem payment system (DPC/PDPS) is the better solution for the problem, with reference to the Hotelling-style spatial competition model. Under FFSRS, we also consider two modes of competition: the Stackelberg case, in which providers can control the number of hospital visits, and the Nash case, in which providers cannot do so. Results indicate that competition under DPC/PDPS is the most intensive of the three modes of competition. To relieve the locational concentration of providers, we also find that DPC/PDPS has a better mechanism than FFSRS.
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