| Project/Area Number |
26885089
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Politics
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| Research Institution | Musashino University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2014-08-29 – 2016-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,730,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥630,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
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| Keywords | レント / カルテル / 規制 / 政府と市場 / 政治制度 / 選挙制度改革 / レントシーキング / 集合行為コスト / プリンシパル＝エージェント / 規制政治 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Politics of regulation in Japan used to be regarded as the closely linked to special interests, especially like large corporations. This research project tries to provide an analysis of the fluctuation of these producer cartels in Japan from a comparative perspective.
By empirically identifying various special interest’ rents and collective action costs in each sector, we could have a couple of results below for further study. Firstly, electoral institutional reform induces the decline of producer rent, but not always the case. Secondly, collective action costs in each sector could be the potential factor for identifying the decline or the sustaining of the producer cartels. Thirdly, political mechanism for explaining those variations could be substantially identified by tracing the process of actual fluctuation of cartel, such as the case in agriculture sector. JA would be the one of the main actors for digging into this issue.
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