| Project/Area Number |
59380010
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Co-operative Research (A)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
科学技術史(含科学社会学・科学技術基礎理論)
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| Research Institution | TOKYO INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY |
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Principal Investigator |
YAMAZAKI MASAKATU TOKYO INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. THE DEPARTMENT OF TECHNOLOGY, 工学部, 助教授 (20106959)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
SASABE AKIRA RITUMEIKAN UNIVERSITY. THE DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ADMINISTRATION, 経営学部, 助教授 (00100933)
HINOKAWA SIZUE TAKUSYOKU UNIVERSITY. THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCIAL SCIENCE, 商学部, 講師 (90134832)
SUGA KOUSAKU TOKYO INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. THE DEPARTMENT OF TECHNOLOGY, 工学部, 助手 (90016642)
MITISITA TOSINORI KYOTO UNIVERSITY. THE DEPARTMENT OF LIBERAL ARTS, 教養部, 助手 (00166050)
FUZIMURA ZYUN YOKOHAMA NATIONAL UNIVERSITY. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 教育学部, 教授 (50017761)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1984 – 1986
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 1986)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥8,400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥8,400,000)
Fiscal Year 1986: ¥900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 1985: ¥1,800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000)
Fiscal Year 1984: ¥5,700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥5,700,000)
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| Keywords | ATOMIC-BOMB / WORLD WAR2 / UNITED STATES / BRITAIN / 独 / 原爆開発 / 第二次大戦 / ロスアラモス / プルトニウム / 投下問題 / 放射能 / 軍事技術 / 戦後政策 |
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| Research Abstract |
1.Collection of the Materials
The materials relating to the development of the atomic-bomb in World War2 are systematically collected. They include MED files, Harrison-Bundy files, "Top-Secret" files, AEC basic documents, H.Stimson's diaries, etc. An essential part of Bush-Conant files is also obtained. The copies of important technical reports relating to Chicago Metallurgical Lab. and Los Alamos Lab. are collected. For the materials apart from U.S., some technical reports of U.K. and Japan are obtained.
2.Analysis of the Materials
It is shown that the real starting point of the development of the atomic-bomb was the establishment of the technological principle of the bomb in 1941 (MAUD report and 3rd report of NAS), and its relation to the political dicision is discussed. The discrepancies between the scientists and the military officers in the selection of technical methods used are partly investigated. In the course of research and development of the bomb. some abnormal technical methods and devices, such as the electro-magnetic separator of uranium isotopes, the big uranium bomb and the implosion device, are pointed out to appear under the military demand and the limited time schedule. It is made clear that the targets of the bomb had been set up against both Germany and Japan till the end of 1943, and the German targets might be eliminated at the begining of 1944 when the Allies caught the information that it was unlikely that Germans might make an atomic-bomb. The assesment of the aftereffects of the bomb was shown to be essentially incomplete because its purpose was limited to ensure the personnel in Trinity test and the combat use.
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