| Project/Area Number |
60510036
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for General Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Psychology
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| Research Institution | Hokkaido University |
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Principal Investigator |
TERAOKA Takashi Hokkaido University, Faculty of Letters, Professor, 文学部, 教授 (70000552)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
MAYUMI Mamiko Hokkaido University, Faculty of Letters, Research Assistant, 文学部, 教務職員 (00142670)
NAKAGAWA Masanori Hokkaido University, Faculty of Letters, Instructor, 文学部, 助手 (40155685)
TAKIGAWA Tetsuo Hokkaido University, Faculty of Letters, Associate Professor, 文学部, 助教授 (30098503)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1985 – 1986
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 1986)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,000,000)
Fiscal Year 1986: ¥400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000)
Fiscal Year 1985: ¥1,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000)
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| Keywords | Tit-for-tat / Prisoner's dilemma / Decomposed game / Experimental game / 方略 |
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| Research Abstract |
"Prisoner's dilemma" means a typical psychological situation involving social conflicts between the motives of the "individual rationality" and the "group rationality" for each player in the experimental game situations. In the situation where the same payoff matrix is repeatedly represented to both the two players, they used to select the non-cooperative alternatives to fall into the "mutual poverty cell" in the prisoner's dilemma. How the players can extricate from this cell has been one of the important subjects in the prisoner's dilemma studies. The two experimental studies were performed to find the concrete means to induce the player's responses into the prosperity cell by focussing to the following aspects: first, the effects of "tit-for-tat" strategies, and second, the effects of the player's cognitive form for the payoff structure which was involved in the situation based upon the "composite decomposed games". The main findings in them were as follows.
In the Experiment I, 1) There were several kinds of strategies concerning the tit-for-tat, and the optimum strategy depended upon the purpose of the player as a "controller" for the situation. 2) For maximizing the joint gain between the two players, the "simultaneous tit-for-tat" was the most adjustable strategy. 3) For maximizing the individual gain, the "tit-for-tat with double revenge" was ajustable strategy. 4) The magnifying power of the revenge for the most adjustable strategy was not decided in the experiment. In the Experiment II, 1) The "composite decomposed games" were not so effective to induce the player's responses into the prosperity cell as they were. 2) The control of the information indicating the structure of situation for the other player was so effective to induce his responses into the prosperity cell. 3) The delay of revenge for the betrayer was not effective.
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