Project/Area Number |
63301075
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Co-operative Research (A)
|
Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Research Field |
一般理論
|
Research Institution | University of Tokyo |
Principal Investigator |
UZAWA Hirofumi University of Tokyo, Faculty of Economics, honorary professor, 経済学部, 名誉教授 (20012106)
|
Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
FUJIWARA Masahiro University of Tokyo, Faculty of Economics, professor, 経済学部, 教授 (40114988)
NISHIMURA Kazuo Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research, professor, 経済研究所, 教授 (60145654)
SUZUMURA Kotaro Hitotsubashi University, Institute of Economic Research, professor, 経済研究所, 教授 (00017550)
KAWAMATA Kunio Keio University, Department of Economics, Professor, 経済学部, 教授 (30051569)
OKADA Akira Saitama University, Institute for policy Science, assistant professor, 政策科学研究科, 助教授 (90152298)
青木 昌彦 京都大学, 経済研究所, 教授 (90027574)
|
Project Period (FY) |
1988 – 1990
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 1990)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥13,500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥13,500,000)
Fiscal Year 1990: ¥3,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,000,000)
Fiscal Year 1989: ¥5,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥5,100,000)
Fiscal Year 1988: ¥5,400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥5,400,000)
|
Keywords | game theory / oligopoly / competition and cooperation / contract and economic organization / Japanese economic system / comparative economic system / economics of information / social choice / 経済循環 / 非協力交渉モデル / 自由 / 経済成長 / 社会的選択 / 人口成長 / ゲーム理論 / 契約理論 / エージェンシー理論 / ランク競争 / ナッシュ均衡 / 社会慣習 / 終身雇用制 / 情報のシェアリング |
Research Abstract |
This research project is an attempt to reconstruct the theoretical foundations of micro and macro economics from the standpoint of game theory. 1. We developed a variety of game-theoretic models which take explicit account of institutional, technoloqical and social constraints binding the rational behaviors of economic agents and successfully provided several mathematical frameworks which are capable of analyzing various social systems not as given data but as different forms of possible game-theoretic equilibria. We clarified how the different informational structures of oligopolistic markets influence the choice between competition and cooperation and studied their impacts on economic welfare as well as possible policy alternatives to improve it. We also examined the relationships among the forms of labor contract, intra-firm organization and inter-firm network. More generally, we made an attempt to reexamine the equilibrium concept by incorporating the notion of social norm into it. 2
… More
. At the same time, since the above mentioned research projects focused on the behavioral patterns, contract forms and organizational designs, they enabled us to analyze such economic institutions as protective industrial policy, life-time employment practice, seniority promotion system, corporate grouping, inter-firm holding of company stocks, the main bank system, etc., which are often regarded as constituting the core of the so-called Japanese economic system. This opened up a new research agenda for the comparative economic system which is different from the old-fashioned capitalism-socialism controversy. 3. We also made some attempts to develop a new macroeconomic theory on the basis of imperfect competition model as well as a set of growth models with non-convexity, uncertainty and endogenous population change which can be linked to the recent development of equilibrium business cycle models. 4. Finally, we did some methodological investigations of game theory itself. The conventional game-theoretic equilibrium notions were reexamined from various standpoints, taking careful account of the underlying information structures. We also proposed a new direction for social choice theory on the basis of a reconsideration of libertarian rights. Less
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