Brentano and His School in Relation to Philosophy of Science

Research Project

Project/Area Number	63510010
Research Category	Grant-in-Aid for General Scientific Research (C)
Allocation Type	Single-year Grants
Research Field	Philosophy
Research Institution	Kansai University
Principal Investigator	JIICHIRO Takeo Kansai University Faculty of Letters Professor, 文学部, 教授 (00067448)
Project Period (FY)	1988 – 1990
Project Status	Completed (Fiscal Year 1990)
Budget Amount *help	¥1,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,900,000) Fiscal Year 1990: ¥400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000) Fiscal Year 1989: ¥600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000) Fiscal Year 1988: ¥900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000)
Keywords	Brentano / Descriptive psychology / Foundationalism / Intensionality / Positivism / Theory of objects / Reference / Vienna Circle / アリストテレス主義 / 観念論的形而上学 / クワイン / 心理主義 / ノイラ-ト / ブレンタ-ノ学派 / 経験論 / 知覚 / センス・デ-タ / 現象学 / 論理実証主義 / 記述心理学 / 普遍記号学 / ウィーン学団 / 内的知覚 / 観察文 / 明証 / 経験的知識
Research Abstract	1. We attempted to make it clear to what extent the positivistic philosophy in the 20th century Vienna is said to be related, in its adoption of the exact and experimental method of science, to the seemingly heterogeneous tradition represented by Brentano and his school. To this end, we studied the position Brentano Kept for his lifelong conviction that the method of philosophy is nothing other than that of empirical science, and asked whether such an aspiration bid fair to be consistent with his philosophical outlook, in view of his epistemology the basis of which comes solely from 'immediately evident judgment'. We also examined, in respect of the 'scientific' goal of philosophy, how Meinong appraised and modified descriptive psychology in his theory of objects. In conclusion, we took it that Brentano and his followers had been emphatic in defense of 'scientific' philosophy not so much about any global and vacuous talk of science in general as about a way of thinking as for what makes our particular sciences possible ; and that, in this respect, Brentanians might well be said to have shared the cause with the positivists, and even with Wittgenstein. 2. We confirmed that the distinctions and the ensuing problems around the concept of intensionality in mental act indeed run parallel to those around that of reference in linguistic expressions. This seems, however, far from giving any definite answer to the question of propositional attitudes ; it only reformulates it. 3. As for the question of the basis of knowledge, the philosophers of the Vienna Circle, let alone Brentanians, were all in all dogmatic foundationalists, with the exception of Neurath in his expositions of foundations and the history of scientific knowledge.