1995 Fiscal Year Final Research Report Summary
The dynamic analysis of the emergence and the collapse of the economic systems
Project/Area Number |
06630003
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for General Scientific Research (C)
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Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Research Field |
経済理論
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Research Institution | CHIBA UNIVERSITY |
Principal Investigator |
SAKAKIBARA Kenichi CHIBA UNIVERSITY., FACULTY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS., ASSOCIATEPROFESSOR, 法経学部, 助教授 (30187009)
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Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
NOMURA Yoshimasa FACULTY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS., PROFESSOR, 法経学部, 教授 (00218372)
IWATA Kazumasa FACULTY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS., PROFESSOR, 法経学部, 教授 (60125284)
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Project Period (FY) |
1994 – 1995
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Keywords | The State / Social Contract / Property Rights / The State of Nature / Hobbes / Locke |
Research Abstract |
The purpose of this research is to analyze the emergence and the collapse of capitalism and socialism in a dynamic model in which these economic systems are endogenously established. To do this, as a preliminary reseach, we investigated the dynamic path of the state which is endogenously established through a social contract. In the model, the state of nature is represented as a non-cooperative solution for individuals' actions that include production and battle. The state is assumed to be an institution that protects property rights under a certain amount of cost. The social contract is specified as an agreement on the share in the cost of the state and is represented as the solution of institutional arrangement game. These solutions are analyzed in relation to economic environments. As for the analysis of the state of nature, (1) We have constructed a model that explains the difference between the state of nature of Hobbes an of Locke as the difference of environmental parameters, not as the difference of views. (2) It has been shown that the dynamic transformation of the state of nature occurs in the economy from Locke type to Hobbes type. As for the state, (1) We have constructed a model in which the state is established endogenously. Also in the framework of two-person game, it has been proven that (2) the state is estsablished iff the wealth of the society is greater than a critical level and the inequality of the wealth is less than a critical ratio, (3) the rich becomes the monarch, and (4) the establishment of the state may enlarge the inequality of the wealth.
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