1997 Fiscal Year Final Research Report Summary
POLITICO-ECONOMIC RESEARCH IN THEDIVERSITY OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
| Project/Area Number |
07630050
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
経済政策(含経済事情)
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| Research Institution | TOKAI UNIVERSITY |
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Principal Investigator |
KAWANOBE Hiroyuki TOKAI UNIVERSITY,SCHOOL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND ECONOMICS,PROFESSOR, 政治経済学部, 教授 (60119667)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1995 – 1997
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| Keywords | INSTITUTIONAL REFORM / PUBLIC CHOICE / DEREGULATION / NEO-INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS / PATH DEPENDENCE / INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION |
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| Research Abstract |
Exclusionism, discretion and cooperation are main features for the Japanese system of decision-making and policy management in economic policy. The iron-triangle connections of bureaucrats, industries and diet policy tribes are formed along with the jurisdiction of each bureau. Holding common information they form relation specific assets by long-run interaction including personnel exchange. Bureaucrats take the discretionary initiative in the industrial policy, and firms as a whole industry cooperatively accept their 'moral persuasion'. Regulation reforms also are performed by the discretional and bureaucracy-led manner under these circumstances.
The reasons for synchronized regulation reform policies in developed countries in 1980s and after are the technological change in former natural monopoly industries, developments of the economic theory of regulation and competition and the needs for privatization of public corporations in deficits.
Because of the globalization of economic activities and the international economic unification, the international difference of regulation policies has the huge effect on the economic performance of each country. If one industry should bear the cost of a protective policy for another industry, its competitivecondition is severely damaged through the globalization of economic activities, and the deregulation is risen up as a political agenda.
International institutional competition grows through the political competition around changing/keeping the existing regulation policy by political entrepreneurs.
The international institutional competition does not necessarily mean the convergence of the deregulation policy in each country. The divergence and convergence of regulation reforms also depends a degree of international linkage of a industry, structures of political institutions and centralization or decentralization of government structures.
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