1998 Fiscal Year Final Research Report Summary
CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF MEINONG'S THEORY OF OBJECTS FROM THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW
| Project/Area Number |
08610003
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Philosophy
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| Research Institution | CHUOGAKUIN UNIVERSITY |
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Principal Investigator |
SATO Hideaki CHUOGAKUIN UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF COMMERCE, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, 商学部, 助教授 (70192599)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1996 – 1998
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| Keywords | Phanomenologie / Gegenstandstheorie / Meinong |
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| Research Abstract |
Meinong's theory of objects influenced Husserl's phenomenology and Russell's theory of descriptions, and is important in establishing a point of contact between phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The theory of objects begins with the paradox of the "representation without objects." This paradox is the "problem of being," that is, of how to deal with nonexistent objects. At the same time, it is also the problem of how to represent nonexistent objects. In face of this paradox Husserl used a method of phenomenological reduction, shelving the problem of being, and proceeded to analyse representation and meaning. Russell's answer to the problem of being was decided from the beginning. That is, "There isn't a nonexistent object". Meinong tried to tackle this problem directly by the analysis of representations. His observations brought him to concepts of the theory of objects, such as the 'Aussersein of the pure object'. These views presuppose that the representations of objects constitute human cognition. However, if this view is mistaken, we must take a different approach to solve the problem of the "representation without objects". Contemporary cognitive science and cognitive linguistics show that human cognition cannot be considered from the point of view of representationalism. Our cognition isn't made from representation, but it is true that we think about nonexistent objects. How ought nonexistent objects be considered from the point of view of non-representationnalism? This is a problem that remains to be solved.
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