2000 Fiscal Year Final Research Report Summary
A STUDY ON MORAL THEORY AS INTERNAL REALISM AND THE REALITY OF FREEDOM
| Project/Area Number |
10610030
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
倫理学
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| Research Institution | Iwate University |
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Principal Investigator |
USAMI Kosei IWATE UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF EDUCATION ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, 教育学部, 助教授 (30183750)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1998 – 2000
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| Keywords | Internal Realism / Freedom / Transcendental idealism / H.Putnam / Modern ethics / Kant / Substantial freedom / Liberalism |
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| Research Abstract |
In the modern tendency toward subjectivism, it is difficult to maintain the naive moral realism. It was a specific character of the modern period that people became aware of the limitation of reason and of the relativity of culture, and also that people began to talk about the human nature and human purpose not from a God's point of view but from a life-sized viewpoint. In these situation, the purpose what one should pursuit depended on only the interests of individuals, not on what moral theory requires, whereas modern moral theory was concerned only with the rules for social behavior and the principles for distribution. But the principles which modern ethics have deduced, brought about many aspects of interminable disagreements on practical moral issues. Furthermore they proved scarcely any effectiveness on cognitive or conductive response required on any practical situation. For that reason, virtue ethics and moral realism, which estimate custom and reality of value, have lately attracted our concern. Restoration of virtue ethics and moral realism, however, might cause the uncritical conservatism or the privileged expert ethics. So the possibility of another type of moral realism, which could conform to the modern multiple values, is our concern and it was found that the Putnam's internal realism and Kant's empirical realism as transcendental idealism would make for it. And upon the internal realism, we argued as follows ;
1. By adopting the internal realism, we could approve the reality of multiple values, but in the modern ethical situation, the most important issue is how we can let freedom have reality.
2. To let freedom have realty means that we ought to assure the freedom substantially which make possible each one to stand one's own feet.
3. A.Sen's capability approach would be useful for the assurance of substantial freedom, But to bring up the cognitive ability on freedom, it is necessary to approach from another perspectives (ex. responsibility).
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