2001 Fiscal Year Final Research Report Summary
Mathematical Analysis of Conflict Resolution
| Project/Area Number |
12680444
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
社会システム工学
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| Research Institution | Kagawa University |
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Principal Investigator |
SHISHIDO Harunori Kagawa University, Faculty of Economics, Professor, 経済学部, 教授 (30109144)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
GUO Peijun Kagawa University, Faculty of Economics, Associate Professor, 経済学部, 助教授 (60325313)
ZENG Dao-zhi Kagawa University, Faculty of Economics, Associate Professor, 経済学部, 助教授 (60284345)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2000 – 2001
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| Keywords | Conflict / Arbitration / Fair Division / Possibilistic Theory / Inconsistency Degree / Prisoner's Dilemma |
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| Research Abstract |
We have published 6 papers and made 4 presentations. The summary of each article is as follows:
(1) We give a new existence result for a general game. Then the result is applied to the symmetric arbitration games FOA and DOA. It is shown that DOA leads to a convergence of offers but FOA does not.
(2) We present a new moving knife procedures for ε-approximate envy-free cake division, whose idea also works well for chores division. The procedure is generalized to multi-fair division. The number of necessary cuts is bounded.
(3) Multi-source possibilistic information is presented by a set of possibilistic constraints to characterize decision variables from different information aspects. Possibilistic linear programming is used to integrate multi-source information into upper and lower possibility distributions of decision vector.
(4) We investigate the conflict situation of experts' knowledge. We present how to resolve such conflict to obtain more reliable and refine knowledge that can be used for decision-making.
(5) An alternating prisoner's dilemma game of linear function moves is considered. We present the existence condition of stable equilibrium points when a player plays a game against the players using the same type of strategies.
(6) A dispute among the local government and residents of two regions is analyzed. We present the resolution of the dispute.
(7) We show that the deficiency of combined arbitration and double-offer arbitration can be corrected by a combination with conventional arbitration.
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