2003 Fiscal Year Final Research Report Summary
Two Level Game Analysis of International Trade Negotiation and Domestic Politics
| Project/Area Number |
13630055
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
|---|
| Section | 一般 |
|---|
| Research Field |
経済政策(含経済事情)
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Kobe University |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
ISHIGURO Kaoru Kobe Univ., Graduate School of Economics, Professor, 経済学研究科, 教授 (20184509)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2001 – 2003
|
| Keywords | international trade negotiation / domestic politics / two level game / sanction / political pressure / policy preference |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
This research examined interdependence of international trade negotiations (an international level) and domestic politics (a domestic level) by two level game theory. It clarified in particular what kind of influence domestic politics gave to international trade negotiations.
This research clarified the following points about political pressure and trade negotiations results. First, when policy preference of a government is similar to its own congress's one, political pressure for the government of objection group of trade liberalization raises a trade barrier of the own country and raises a foreign trade barrier. Second, when policy preference of the government is different from the congress's one moderately, negotiations results are determined by the government's preference and political pressure to the congress does not influence negotiations results. Third, when policy preference of the government is different from the congress's enough, negotiations results are determined by the co
… More
ngress's preference and political pressure to the government does not influence negotiations results.
This research clarified the following points about a threat of sanctions by the foreign government and results of trade negotiations. Effects of a threat of sanctions by the foreign government are dependent on estrangement degree of policy preference for trade liberalization between the government and domestic members (congress). First, when policy preference of the government is similar to its own domestic member's one, sanctions by the foreign government decrease the trade barrier of the own country and raise the foreign one. Second, when policy preference of the government is different from the congress's one moderately, sanctions by the foreign government do not influence negotiations results. Third, when policy preference of the government is different from the congress's one enough, sanctions by the foreign government decrease the trade barrier of the own country, but do not have an influence on the foreign one. Less
|
