2003 Fiscal Year Final Research Report Summary
Economic Policy of Horizontal Competition Restraint
| Project/Area Number |
13630060
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
|---|
| Section | 一般 |
|---|
| Research Field |
経済政策(含経済事情)
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Kobe University |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
YANAGAWA Takashi Kobe University, Graduate School of Economics, Professor, 経済学研究科, 教授 (60247616)
|
|---|
| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
YOSHINO Ichiro Nagoya University of Commerce and Business, Faculty of Business Administration, Professor, 総合経営学部, 教授 (90267922)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2001 – 2003
|
| Keywords | horizontal competition restraint / competition policy / cartel / surcharge / market concentration / oligopoly / airline industry / industry restructuring |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
Our major research topics are : (1) the effect of surcharge on the cartel deterrence, and study of the desirable surcharge system. (2) worldwide market concentration of major industries due to the market globalization, and (3) the effect of the various corporate strategies on the market concentration and economic welfare.
As for (1), we analyzed theoretically the effect of various surcharge bases and surcharge rates on the cartel deterrence and economic welfare. We conclude that the surcharge system based on damages is preferred in the sense that it can increase output of a cartel.
As for (2), we find that the concentration ratios of major industries are not increasing so rapidly recently when we see the concentration trends after 1980s, even though we have seen many mergers and acquisitions since the late 1990s. However, we find that the mergers and acquisitions, and many types of coalitions raise the concentration ratios calculated by groups of firms.
As for (3), we consider the problems of consolidation of Japan Airlines and Japan Air System from the viewpoint of competition policy. We point out that the more slots for departing and landing should have been returned for encouraging new entry, that a duopoly of equally competitive airlines after merger may be easier to collude than oligopoly which consists of one dominant firm and two fringes, and that competition might be restricted on the routes where the super express trains are not good substitutes for passengers. Also we consider intervention in airfares of Japan Fair Trade Commission after the de-regulation. We conclude that intervening in airfares was necessary to stop predation and keep long-run competition in the market, but price-cost relationship should have been analyzed, and length and the order of price-cut should have been specified.
|
