2004 Fiscal Year Final Research Report Summary
A Japan-China Comparison of the evolution of corporate governance system and the estimation of transaction costs
Project/Area Number |
14330036
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
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Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Business administration
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Research Institution | Keio University |
Principal Investigator |
UETAKE Teruhisa Keio Univ., Business & Commerce, Prof., 商学部, 教授 (80051556)
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Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
WATANABE Naoki Keio Univ., Business & Commerce, Prof., 商学部, 教授 (50095668)
TANIGUCHI Kazuhiro Keio Univ., Business & Commerce, Asso.Prof., 商学部, 助教授 (60338233)
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Project Period (FY) |
2002 – 2004
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Keywords | Transaction Cost Economics / Comparative Institutional Analysis / Comparative Corporate Governance / Institutional Complementarity / Capability / Social Capital / Coordination Game / Transitional Economics |
Research Abstract |
From a comparative perspective, we have studied the evolution of corporate governance system and the estimation of transaction costs. In doing so, we built up a theory based on Transaction Cost Economics and Comparative Institutional Analysis and collected comparative and historical information through an empirical study of Japanese and Chinese firms. Our findings are as follows : to understand the logic of organizational change, it is necessary to have a theory of comparative corporate governance relying on such concepts as institution and entrepreneurship ; game theory is an effective tool for explaining the interconnectedness or complementarities among institutions and strategic interactions of human agents ; transmission of specific knowledge and capabilities results in complementarities between strategy and organization ; in China, new institutional economics have flowered. It would be possible to estimate transaction costs based on the methodology of game theoretical experiment, unlike the work of Douglass North. It is likely that transaction cost economizing results from the emergence of social capital that enables coordination of decisions and actions. In this sense, coordination game is useful. In post-reform China, relationship between theory and policy formation underpinned the process of economic transition.
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