2003 Fiscal Year Final Research Report Summary
Theoretical Investigation on R&D Investment and Oligopolistic Models with Spillovers
| Project/Area Number |
14530011
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
経済理論
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| Research Institution | OKAYAMA UNIVERSITY |
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Principal Investigator |
HARUNA Shoji Okayama University, Economics, Professor, 経済学部, 教授 (30136775)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2002 – 2003
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| Keywords | R&D investment / Spillover / Cournot oligopoly model / Bertrand Oligopoly model / Catel / Optimal trade policy / Two-stage game model |
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| Research Abstract |
1. Whether or not the government with export firms employs export subsidies as trade policy depends on both levels of R&D spillover and the relative cost of R&D investment. For example, when either the relative cost is high or it is not so high and the spillover level is relatively large, the otimal trade policy is laisser-faaire or export tax : namely, the possibility depends on both levels. Export subsidies cause the promotion of export and R&D investment to increase.
the strategic model with R&D investment in the presence of its spillover as well as for the nonstrategic model. Moreover, although whether or not firms under Cournot-quantity competition use RED investment strategically depends on the level of spillover, the incentive for firms under Bertrand-price competition to use R&D is small.
3. Whether firms disclose their results created by R&D depends on the sign of the cross price effect in terms of a demand function, irrespective of whether the firms are involved in quantity or price competition in the market. Moreover, the formation of an R&D cartel of oligopolistic firms will increase both R&D expenditure and profits. When products are substitutes, firms under quantity competition will obtain more in the presence of R&D cooperation than in the absence of it.
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