2017 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Theoretical investigation of decentralized matching markets
| Project/Area Number |
15K13002
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | University of Tsukuba |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / マッチング理論 / 制度比較 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
I focus on college admissions matching where there are colleges with finite capacities, and students have abilities as private information and compete for seats in colleges as the result of their effort. I modeled it as a contest game. In addition, we compare the centralized mechanism with the decentralized. I proved the existence of the unique symmetric equilibrium for both of the centralized and decentralized mechanisms. We showed that low-ability students prefer the decentralized, while high-ability students prefer the centralized. We conducted the laboratory experiment on this game and confirmed the theoretical results.
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| Free Research Field |
ミクロ経済学、ゲーム理論、マッチング・マーケットデザイン
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