Foundations of Scoring Auction Theory

2017 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 15K13005
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Nagoya University
• Principal Investigator: Hanazono Makoto 名古屋大学, 経済学研究科, 教授 (60362406)
• Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha): 中林 純 近畿大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (30565792)
• Research Collaborator: Hirose Yohsuke 明治学院大学, 経済学部, 助教 ; Tsuruoka Masanori 横浜国立大学, 経済学部, 准教授
• Project Period (FY): 2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
• Keywords: スコアリングオークション / 多次元パラメータ

Outline of Final Research Achievements

We build models of scoring auctions and obtain the following highly useful results. First, we consider a symmetric auction in which bidder's private information is multidimensional, and derive a condition under which an equilibrium of the bidding game exists. The condition is that the dimensions of private information that influence fixed costs of each bidder is perpendicular to those that affect variable costs. Second, we study the effects of bid restrictions such as price upper-bound or quality bounds in the model of single-dimensional private information. We show that the analysis is basically the same as in the model without restrictions unless the multiple inequality restrictions bind at the same time.

Free Research Field

産業組織論、ゲーム理論