An evolutionary approach on multitasking environments and cooperative games

2017 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 15K17023
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: University of Tsukuba (2016-2017); The University of Aizu (2015)
• Principal Investigator: Sawa Ryoji 筑波大学, システム情報系, 准教授 (70644566)
• Project Period (FY): 2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
• Keywords: Evolutionary game theory / Stochastic stability / Multitasking / Cooperative games

Outline of Final Research Achievements

We consider the best response dynamic in a multitasking environment, and a dynamic process of collective choice under majority rules. For the first setting, agents engage in multiple games and can switch their action only in one of the games upon receipt of a revision opportunity. The choice of the game in which to revise an action is made according to their task choice rules. We verify global stability of the Nash equilibrium set in potential and stable games.
For the latter setting, we consider a dynamic process of collective choice where a status quo policy is challenged by an opposing policy drawn randomly in each period. Applying stochastic evolutionary game theory, we characterize a long run equilibrium policy. A Condorcet winner is a long run equilibrium for all majority rules, and it is uniquely so if a majority quota is greater than the min-max quota. The Borda winner can be a long run equilibrium under unanimity rule if voters’ behavior is governed by a logit choice rule.

Free Research Field

Evolutionary game theory