Employers' decision on the use of temporary contracts and employment policy

2017 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 15K17081
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Public finance/Public economy
• Research Institution: Soka University
• Principal Investigator: Masui Makoto 創価大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (50409778)
• Project Period (FY): 2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
• Keywords: 雇用保護 / 労働インセンティブ / 人的資本蓄積

Outline of Final Research Achievements

In this research project, I dealt with the following three topics: (i) employers' objectives of using temporary contracts, (ii) effort choice by temporary and regular workers, (iii) provision of firm-sponsored training to temporary workers. Regarding the first subject, I numerically identified factors which induce employers to use temporary contracts as a screening device. Regarding the second subject, I theoretically showed that more stringent employment protection associated with regular jobs not only induces regular workers to shirk, but also decreases the proportion of workers in a match that the true quality of the match is revealed to be good. The latter effect leads to a reduction in the average productivity of regular jobs. Regarding the third subject, I theoretically showed that relaxing firing regulations on regular jobs contributes to an increase in the proportion of temporary workers who receive firm-provided training.

Free Research Field

労働経済学