2016 Fiscal Year Research-status Report
Mechanism Design and Budget-Constrained Agents
| Project/Area Number |
16K03545
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| Research Institution | Otaru University of Commerce |
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Principal Investigator |
小島 直樹 小樽商科大学, 商学部, 教授 (70547869)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2016-10-21 – 2020-03-31
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| Keywords | Mechanism Design / Revelation Principle / Budget Constraint |
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| Outline of Annual Research Achievements |
I published a paper "Implementability by a Canonical Indirect Mechanism of an Optimal Two-Dimensional Direct Mechanism" in Theoretical Economics Letters 07(02), 187-192, January 2017. The content to the paper does not have direct bearing upon the outline of the present project. While carrying out research, I hit on an idea which is pertinent to the project.
I have drafted another paper "General Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents", which bears directly on the project and is the first paper proposed in the project. I have got it accepted by this year's Asian and Chinese meetings of the Econometric Society. This is a paper dealing with the principal with cost faced to budget-constrained agent-buyers.
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| Current Status of Research Progress |
Current Status of Research Progress
2: Research has progressed on the whole more than it was originally planned.
Reason
Research has been making headway according to plan. I have got one paper out for publication and another for presentation. The reason of smooth sailing is that the nub of the problem or the difficulty has been found to lie where I suspected it to be at the beginning of the project. There was no mishap in the process of conducting research. In other words, there was no bad surprise. I had just to bring my initial ideas into being.
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| Strategy for Future Research Activity |
I will try to complete and disseminate "General Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents" everywhere possible, in particular, at prestigious international conferences and submit it to one of the top journals in the world.
I intend to extend the analysis by "General Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents" to another context. To be concrete, I mean to consider a case in which the principal designs a contract to agents with limited liabilities. This issue is quite parallel to the above paper. I reckon that the same method as in "General Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents" can be directly carried over to that problem.
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Research Products
(1 results)
