2017 Fiscal Year Research-status Report
Mechanism Design and Budget-Constrained Agents
Project/Area Number |
16K03545
|
Research Institution | Fukuoka University |
Principal Investigator |
小島 直樹 福岡大学, 経済学部, 教授 (70547869)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2016-10-21 – 2020-03-31
|
Keywords | Mechanism Design / Revelation Principle / Budget Constraint |
Outline of Annual Research Achievements |
I published a paper titled "Two-Dimensional Mechanism Design and Implementability by an Indirect Mechanism" in Theoretical Economics Letters 07(06), pp1595-pp1601, October 2017. The content of the paper does not have direct bearing on the outline of the present project. While carrying out research, I hit on an idea of the paper.
In 2017, I also presented a paper titled "General Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents" at two international conferences, namely Asian and Chinese meetings of the Econometric Society. The paper is the first paper proposed in the project, which deals with the principal faced to budget-constrained agent-buyers in the presence of cost.
|
Current Status of Research Progress |
Current Status of Research Progress
2: Research has progressed on the whole more than it was originally planned.
Reason
Research has been making headway according to plan. I have got one additional paper out for publication and presented the first paper of the project at two prestigeous international conferences.
The reason of plain sailing is that the snag of the project has been found where I suspected it to lie at the beginning of the project. There was no mishap or bad surprise in the process of conducting research.
|
Strategy for Future Research Activity |
I will try to get "General Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents" published in one of the top journals in the world.
I intend to carry out research on the present project as planned.
|
Research Products
(3 results)