Mechanism Design and Budget-Constrained Agents

2018 Fiscal Year Research-status Report

• Project/Area Number: 16K03545
• Research Institution: Fukuoka University
• Principal Investigator: 小島 直樹 福岡大学, 経済学部, 教授 (70547869)
• Project Period (FY): 2016-10-21 – 2020-03-31
• Keywords: Mechanism Design / Revelation Principle / Budget Constraint

Outline of Annual Research Achievements

Earlier, I had presented a paper titled "General Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents" at two conferences, or
Asian and Chinese meetings of the Econometric Society.

I revised the paper several times and submitted it or "Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents" to the International Journal of Game Theory. It is under review at present.

Current Status of Research Progress

2: Research has progressed on the whole more than it was originally planned.

Reason

Roughly speaking, research has been making progress as was planned. There were no unexpected or surprising technical difficulties during the conduct of the research. That is the reason of the research going according to plan.

Strategy for Future Research Activity

I will wait for the journal to give the answer to my submission of "Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents". Depending on the result, I mean to get it out in a top journal of the field.

I also intend to carry out research on the present project as planned.