Experimental Approach for Rent Seeking Problem

2019 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 16K03562
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Waseda University
• Principal Investigator: Kazumi Shimizu 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 教授 (20308133)
• Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha): 上條 良夫 高知工科大学, 経済・マネジメント学群, 教授 (40453972) ; 大薗 博記 鹿児島大学, 法文教育学域法文学系, 准教授 (50709467)
• Project Period (FY): 2016-04-01 – 2020-03-31
• Keywords: コンテスト理論 / ゲーム理論 / 行動経済学 / 実験

Outline of Final Research Achievements

The most important point about small groups is that they may very well be able to provide themselves　with a collective good((Olson ,1965).From the stand of “group size paradox” a la Olson (1965), a large group or a large organization should be failed to win the contest against a small one. However, in the economic realms, many large firms prosper despite the group size paradox suggesting that they should lose the contest.In this study, we will answer this twisted situation between the "group size paradox" and reality.
We found (1)"Group Size Paradox" doesn’t occur in auction-like contest theoretically, (2)high cooperation was not achieved and that peer reward and punishment did not function when, and only when, the group was divided into localized groups and the payoff structure was locally inefficient.

Free Research Field

実験経済学

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

1) Auction-Like Contestでは“group size paradox”は発生せず、実験においてもAuction-Like Contestでは小グループの勝利はほとんど見られないことがわかった。また、 “Minimal”" epsilon equilibriumは、純粋戦略Nash equilibriumはなく、混合戦略Nash equilibriumが非現実的であるゲームのクラスの分析ツールの有力な候補となりうることも分かった。
2) 懲罰・報酬にもコストがかかる場合、その対象となる相手を無制限に選べるものではなくその困難さは社会が分割化されるほど増大する。