The strategic use of referendums in EU intergovernmental negotiations

2018 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 16K17076
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: International relations
• Research Institution: Tokai University
• Principal Investigator: Takeda Ken 東海大学, 政治経済学部, 講師 (10704869)
• Project Period (FY): 2016-04-01 – 2019-03-31
• Keywords: EU / 国民投票 / 交渉戦術

Outline of Final Research Achievements

This research is considered to have produced two insights concerning the strategic use of referendums in EU negotiations. First, it revealed that there are three main ways of using a referendum in negotiations inside the EU; (1)pledging referendums, (2)promising not to hold a referendum, and (3)protesting EU decisions. Second, it was found that the EU has developed a shared belongings and a sense of friendship among various actors involved in the EU, and under such an environment, when promising not holding a referendum, it is most likely to produce an expected effect as a negotiation tactic. On the other hand, this research also suggests that the tactic in which actors try to obtain concessions in their favor by pledging a referendum is less likely to be effective, since the use of the tactics is widely seen to be unacceptable in the eyes of other actors in the EU.

Free Research Field

国際関係論、EUの政治

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

本研究は、EUという組織の中では、各国の政治指導者、外交官の間で一定の仲間意識（共有の帰属意識、社会的アイデンティティ）が一定程度、発達していることが明らかになった。その仲間意識があるゆえに、交渉戦術としても仲間に受け入れられる交渉戦術（国民投票を行わない）が効果をもちやすく、仲間に受け入れられない戦術（国民投票を行う）は、反発を引き起こし効果がでにくいことが本研究からは示唆された。先行研究では、EUにおいては、国民投票の戦術利用が効果を持ちやすいと言われていたが、使い方によって、その効果に大きな差が生じることが本研究からは示唆されたのである。