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2006 Fiscal Year Final Research Report Summary

Economic Analysis of Public Procurement by Contract Theory

Research Project

Project/Area Number 17530145
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

Allocation TypeSingle-year Grants
Section一般
Research Field Economic theory
Research InstitutionKYUSHU UNIVERSITY

Principal Investigator

MIURA Isao  Kyushu University, Faculty of Economics, Professor, 大学院経済学研究院, 教授 (30239173)

Project Period (FY) 2005 – 2006
KeywordsMulti-divisional Auction / PFI / Incomplete Contract Theory / Bid Rigging / Repeated Game
Research Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the feature of Public Procurement, especially PFI and Total Evaluation Winner Mechanism, applying contract theory. Firstly, I considered the case that there was uncertainty about PFI project and we couldn't verify the action of PFI firm. And I examined how does the possibility of reconstruction for itself effect on PFI project when the project become bankruptcy in the framework of incomplete contract theory. As the result, I showed that the firm select a lower effort level under the perfect equilibrium than otherwise and also showed what sort of condition was needed to reconstruction for itself bring socially optimal outcome.
Second, I studied the total evaluation winner mechanism. Specially I focused the mechanism that estimate by sum of the quality and cost about PFI project. Then I assumed that the bidder with high quality and high cost has higher score than the one with low quality and low cost. Then I could attain two interesting results : (1 … More ) while efficient firm bids low price and inefficient firm does high price in symmetric equilibrium irrespective of his technical level in the case that each bidder cannot control his technical level, more inefficient bidder become, higher is possibility that he select lower quality in symmetric equilibrium in the case that the bidder who has high technical level can select low quality and he can save PFI cost by doing it, (2) however I showed that such a inefficient situation was able to improve to a certain degree by making procurer use technical reward system to maintain the quality level.
Moreover I examined deregulation, competition polity and repeated game as complementation of above mentioned work. The former was that I surveyed the present condition of Japan about the deregulation and considered competition polity by anti-monopolistic law and specially analyzed "HUTOU NA TORIHIKI SEIGEN NO KINSI" as a viewpoint of economics. The later was that I considered infinite-horizon repeated game and surveyed the Folk-theorem both the case of perfect monitoring and imperfect (public) monitoring. Less

  • Research Products

    (8 results)

All 2006

All Journal Article (6 results) Book (2 results)

  • [Journal Article] 入札談合をいかに防止するか2006

    • Author(s)
      三浦 功
    • Journal Title

      経済セミナー(日本評論社) No. 616

      Pages: 27-30

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(和文)」より
  • [Journal Article] 公共入札における総合評価落札方式2006

    • Author(s)
      三浦 功
    • Journal Title

      九州大学経済学部Discussion Paper No. 2006-6

      Pages: 1-21

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(和文)」より
  • [Journal Article] 規制緩和と競争政策(第9章)2006

    • Author(s)
      三浦 功
    • Journal Title

      公共経済学(緒方(他編))(勁草書房)

      Pages: 199-224

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(和文)」より
  • [Journal Article] ゲームと情報の経済学(第9章)2006

    • Author(s)
      三浦 功
    • Journal Title

      ゲームと情報の経済学(細江(他編))(勁草書房)

      Pages: 201-219

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(和文)」より
  • [Journal Article] How can the bid rigging be prevented?2006

    • Author(s)
      I.Miura
    • Journal Title

      Economic seminar(NIHON HYORONSHA) No.616

      Pages: 27-30

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(欧文)」より
  • [Journal Article] Total Evaluation Winner System in Public Biddings2006

    • Author(s)
      I.Miura
    • Journal Title

      Faculty of Economics Kyushu University, Discussion Paper No.2006-6

      Pages: 1-21

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(欧文)」より
  • [Book] Deregulation and Competitive Policy (Ch.9), Public Economics(Ogata et al.(eds))2006

    • Author(s)
      I.Miura
    • Total Pages
      199-224
    • Publisher
      KEISO SHOBO
    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(欧文)」より
  • [Book] Repeated Game (Ch.9), Game Theory and Economics of Information(Hosoe et al.(eds))2006

    • Author(s)
      I.Miura
    • Publisher
      KEISO SHOBO
    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(欧文)」より

URL: 

Published: 2008-05-27  

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