A new prospect of fisheries resource management by applying a game-theoretic approach

2006 Fiscal Year Final Research Report Summary

• Project/Area Number: 17580155
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Single-year Grants
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: General fisheries
• Research Institution: The University of Tokyo
• Principal Investigator: YAMAKAWA Takashi The University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Agricultural and Life Sciences, Associate Professor, 大学院農学生命科学研究科, 助教授 (10345184)
• Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha): AOKI Ichiro The University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Agricultural and Life Sciences, Professor, 大学院農学生命科学研究科, 教授 (40114350)
• Project Period (FY): 2005 – 2006
• Keywords: game theory / fish stock / fishery management / cooperative game / Nash equilibrium / pooling system / income allocation / tragedy of the commons

Research Abstract

We developed and proposed the concept of a non-cooperative pooling system as a new fisheries management system to remedy the "tragedy of the commons" and evaluate its management performance by applying a game theoretic approach. This system shares the pooled income according to a certain sharing rule which is intended to achieve the desirable Nash equilibrium for the pre-agreed objectives, such as the conservation of decreased stock. By using such a framework, we can modify the payoff function among the fishermen and internalize the external diseconomy of the fishery. We evaluated its robustness and flexibility compared with three other fisheries by changing the factors such as price conditions etc. The non-cooperative pooling system enhances the long-term income and conserves the spawning stock biomass and can readily respond to a variety of factors by changing the value of the tuning parameters in the sharing rule. Although there remains much scope for improvement for practical use, the concept of this system has potential to contribute to the attainment of sustainable fisheries management.