2017 Fiscal Year Annual Research Report
The effect of 2006 Long-term Care Insurance Amendment on Cost Containment: an empirical evidence from nationally representative claims data
| Project/Area Number |
17H07182
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| Research Institution | Waseda University |
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Principal Investigator |
富 蓉 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 助手 (70805259)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2017-08-25 – 2019-03-31
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| Keywords | moral hazard / long-term care insurance / matching method |
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| Outline of Annual Research Achievements |
I summarized the findings in an article entitled "Moral Hazard under Zero Price Policy: Evidence from Japanese Long-term Care Claims Data"and submitted it to the Journal of Public Economics. What if out-of-pocket price is reduced to zero in long-term care insurance (LTCI) market? This study documents the presence and magnitude of moral hazard in Japan’s LTCI market using 120-month claim records covering the entire market. The subsample is extracted as-good-as random by applying propensity score matching method. The results show 0.98million yen (US$ 9172.8) higher lifetime cost of LTCI with respect to a reduction in co-payment rate from 10% to 0%. Morally motivated insureds require a broader range of services and have longer days of utilization than others do. The magnitude of moral hazard in LTCI is larger than what studies observed in health insurance markets is confirmed, which could be explained by the increased predictability of care needs, a combination of unfavorable health and cautiousness of insureds, and the highly price-sensitive measurement for moral hazard. Furthermore, moral hazard correlates positively with ex-ante health risks. The positive correlation indicates a larger moral hazard in public LTCI than what is observed in private LTCI, since mandatory enrollment may enlarge the ex-ante risks. Emphasis is placed on regulations that guide insureds toward efficient service utilizations. Policies reducing ex-ante health-related risks, such as preventative health care programs in young and middle-aged generations, would also effectively restrict moral hazard.
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| Current Status of Research Progress |
Current Status of Research Progress
2: Research has progressed on the whole more than it was originally planned.
Reason
The process is conducted as expected. Specifically, summarized the findings in an article entitled "Moral Hazard under Zero Price Policy: Evidence from Japanese Long-term Care Claims Data" and presented the findings in both domestic and international conferences.
1. International Health Economics Association 12th World Congress, “Moral Hazard in the Long-term Care Market: evidence from Japanese claims data”, 13 July 2017, Boston University, Boston, USA.
2. CPPE Annual Conference, "Moral Hazard under Zero Price Policy: Evidence from Japanese Long-term Care Claims Data, 23 March 2018, Waseda Universtiy, Tokyo, Japan
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| Strategy for Future Research Activity |
Based on the data we collate in FY2017, In FY2018, we attempt to further investigate the supplier-induced demands in the LTC market. Specifically, the research in FY2018 is conducted in two stages as the following flowchart illustrates.
(1) Investigation of supplier-induced demand (from April 2018 to July 2018)
(2) Dissemination of refined results (from August 2018 to March 2019)
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Research Products
(4 results)
